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Abstract
This article investigates whether EU accession can help Bulgaria and Romania limit state capture
and the undue influence of business actors on the policy process. Particularly vulnerable to such
influence, Bulgarian and Romanian institutions are monitored through the EU’s co-operation and
verification mechanism and the Commission and ECJ infringement procedures. We argue that,
under certain conditions, these tools can improve the quality of democracy in both countries. The
key conditions are the presence of domestic actors able to use the EU and carry over procedural
policy requirements from the acquis to other policy-making. Analysing policy-making processes
in the forestry sector, we find NGOs able to use EU links and governments sensitive to naming
and shaming can result in a positive influence of EU rules on the policy process and quality of
democracy. This is true even in least likely cases, such as non-acquis policy areas in Bulgaria and
Romania.
Introduction
Ten years after the initial eastern enlargement, the European Union’s ability to support the
fragile democracies of its post-communist Member States appears more uncertain than
ever (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014). The threat of democratic backsliding seems especially
acute for the laggards of the eastern enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania, where state
capture and organized crime have undermined democratic institutions and the rule of law.
In this article we argue that being part of the EU’s multi-level system ensures that EU
institutions can act as a final check and balance when national institutions fail. The EU
institutions we assess include the co-operation and verification mechanism (CVM) and the
EU’s regular compliance mechanisms. Furthermore, we examine whether the EU’s pres-
ence and special attention for democratic rules and procedures can improve the quality of
democracy in Bulgaria and Romania by focusing on a less explored dimension of demo-
cratic governance: the policy process. We find that even in least likely cases, such as
Bulgaria and Romania, and even in a non-acquis policy space, domestic actors can and do
use EU rules to improve policy procedures and limit state capture. We further specify the
conditions under which such influence is possible.
As Scharpf (1997) has argued, effective problem-solving provides an important aspect
of democratic legitimation in the EU. While post-communist democratic institutions at the
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macro level, such as political parties or constitutional rules, have been the focus of much
scholarly analysis, policy processes have not received much attention from a democrati-
zation perspective. Arguably, it is here that joining the EU can make a considerable
difference – first, because enlargement’s impact has been stronger on policy measures
than on the basic constitutional features of politics (Sedelmeier, 2011) and, second,
because aspects of the policy process, such as effectiveness and inclusiveness, are par-
ticularly vulnerable to state capture and corruption. If the EU’s rules and norms can act as
safeguards against the dominance of the policy process by one set of actors – for example,
business interests – this would help limit state capture and corruption and improve the
quality of democracy. For this to happen, other actors need to connect with the EU and use
it as a resource to guarantee proper rules and procedures.
To establish whether the EU can indeed play such a role post-accession, we use process
tracing to examine two policy processes in Bulgaria and Romania, the new Member States
most affected by state capture and corruption. Following Morlino (2009), we conceptu-
alize democratic quality as rooted in the procedural aspects of policy-making and the
content and satisfaction of users. A quality democracy is one in which citizens can check
the efficacy, responsibility and adherence of governments to rule of law and their account-
ability to demands expressed by civil society (Morlino, 2009, p. 4). Scharpf’s (1997, p. 6)
concept of ‘output legitimation’ – a democracy’s ability to solve problems effectively –
also emphasizes the link between democracy and public policy. If we have effective
policies that solve societal problems, it contributes to democratic legitimation and to the
quality of democracy (see also Orenstein, 2002). We see a policy process as contributing
to the quality of democracy when it takes place according to established formal pro-
cedures, delivers quality content (policy, law) and is effective in solving problems.
Furthermore, based on existing literature on state capture, we stress the link between the
adherence to proper (formal) procedures in the policy process (rule of law) and limiting
state capture and corruption.
Building on this definition, we evaluate the EU’s role in providing rules for policy-
making, in safeguarding the rule of law by acting as a (potential) final instance of appeal
when formal consultation procedures are neglected and as a resource for domestic actors
seeking to participate in policy-making. We focus on policy processes rather than outcomes,
and aim to establish whether the EU can help domestic actors safeguard aspects of the
policy process such as public consultation and rule of law. We expect that the EU is
potentially able to influence democracy at the policy-making level through two mecha-
nisms. First, it can use rules and sanctions directly. Second, and more important in our cases,
the EU can exert an influence in coalition with domestic non-state actors, when such actors
hold preferences in favour of EU policies and invoke formal rules in terms of substance or
procedure (participation of stakeholders, public consultation mechanisms).
Our analysis focuses on EU environmental policy. We chose this area because it is one
where preconditions exist for the EU to influence the policy procedures, as these are
embedded in the EU policy itself (Andonova, 2005; Freyburg et al., 2009). The analysis
is based on an actor-oriented institutionalist framework that assumes that the existence of
EU rules is a necessary, but insufficient condition for quality policy-making. Only if there
are domestic actors – at the state or society levels – that seek to use the new rules and
involve the EU as a resource for legitimation or sanctions in case of violation, can this
result in better policy-making. Actors might use EU rules in two different ways. First,
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formal EU rules pertaining to procedural aspects of policy-making are invoked and
become ‘rules-in-use’ (Ostrom, 1999), leading, if needed, to EU sanctions through the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Second, norms and procedures of better policy-making
can spill over to other, non-acquis policy measures, where the EU is used as a political
resource by actors interested in maintaining these norms.
The article proceeds as follows. The first part elaborates the connection between the
captured state – the biggest challenge to democratic consolidation in the central and
eastern Europe (CEE) context – and ineffective, non-transparent policy-making. It then
discusses the instruments the EU has introduced post-accession to cope with corruption
and state capture. Establishing the limitations of the EU’s tools, we discuss the role of
domestic actors and their interactions with the EU in the next section. Presenting an
actor-oriented institutionalist framework similar to the one developed by Scharpf (1997),
we specify the context-specific categories of domestic actors and their role in relation to
EU policies. We then use a least likely case selection in which we choose a non-acquis
policy measure and test our expectations for improved policy process on two cases of
policy-making in the forestry sector in Bulgaria and Romania.
Our choice of countries follows the least likely case logic, as Bulgaria and Romania
can be characterized as weak states with weak societies, which, at first sight, might be
thought to prevent improvement of the policy process after accession. The variation of
green civil society strength between the two countries allows us to establish whether the
use of the EU as a resource by strong non-governmental organization (NGO) actors can
result in improvements in the policy process despite unfavourable general conditions.
Based on this, we can claim that the EU’s instruments and the use of the EU by domestic
actors can have a positive impact on the quality of democracy in the new Member States
under specific conditions.
I. The EU’s Post-Accession Tools for Better Governance in Weak States
For all the positive expectations linked to joining the EU, citizens in the new Member
States cannot be expected to distinguish between EU-related and non-EU-related policy-
making. From a citizen’s perspective, the EU’s monitoring of acquis implementation does
not necessarily improve policy-making and governance in general. The patchy character
of EU influence is not so problematic in effective states with inclusive and transparent
policy processes, but is a problem in weak and captured states. In the following para-
graphs, we will discuss briefly the effects of state weakness, capture and corruption on
policy-making and the post-accession tools the EU has to counteract such effects.
Despite decades of reform and accession preparations, CEE states, and especially
Bulgaria and Romania, remain weak in two key aspects. First, they are still weak in
formulating and implementing coherent policies – a weakness long identified in the
scholarly literature (cf. Stark and Bruszt, 1998, pp. 112–23). This weakness is especially
evident with regard to strategic policy-making capacity and the ability to incorporate
feedback and assess the impact of policy measures (World Bank, 2006). Second, state
weakness manifests itself as an inability to cope with corruption due to capture (Karklins,
2005). State capture subverts a state’s regulatory capacity as networks of entrepreneurs
and ‘mass political parties’ (Innes, 2014) compromise key structures of governance
(Ganev, 2007; Hellman, 1998). At the policy level, the undue influence of actors capturing
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state structures – Hellman’s ‘early winners’ in the transformation process – subverts the
policy process and biases it towards specific policy outcomes, limiting transparency and
the participation of other stakeholders. Such actors act as informal veto players
(Dimitrova, 2010), limiting adherence to formal rules and procedures.
EU institutions took notice of informal veto players undermining democratic institu-
tions at the end of the enlargement process when their presence manifested itself as
corruption and organized crime. As Innes (2014) argues, processes of post-communist
party competition render all post-communist states open to state capture. Bulgaria and
Romania have been particularly vulnerable due to weak democratic elites and also lower
levels of economic growth that make the state – and post-accession, also the EU –
attractive targets. To address these threats, the EU instituted a co-operation and verifica-
tion mechanism (CVM)1 as a post-accession oversight tool for Bulgaria and Romania.
Thus, in the case of the ‘laggard’ members of the eastern accession the EU has at its
disposal two sets of tools: the non-acquis-based CVM and the ‘traditional mechanisms’
focusing on policy and enforcement of the acquis (Sedelmeier, 2014).
The CVM was created to encourage judicial reform, the curbing of corruption and
organized crime. Initially, it did not appear to have a noticeable impact, partly because
negative monitoring reports from the Commission were not linked to sanctions
(Spendzharova and Vachudova, 2012; Sedelmeier, 2014). Later, as Spendzharova and
Vachudova showed, Member States managed to add some bite to the CVM by using
conditionality attached to Schengen area membership and domestic electoral dynamics.
The existence of the CVM creates a general context that helps domestic actors limit state
capture and improve democratic quality in two ways: first, the CVM’s effect is linked to
pre-existing political legitimation mechanisms, and second, it provides a focus for the
efforts of civil society to hold governments accountable.
Accession to the EU had not only been an all-encompassing policy goal for CEE
governments, it was also a source of legitimation for political elites (Fink-Hafner, 1999).
The use of the phrase ‘returning to Europe’ led to rhetorical entrapment not only of the EU
leaders who had promised accession (Schimmelfennig, 2001), but also to post-communist
politicians. The symbolic and legitimation mechanisms used during enlargement, being
normative in nature, survived the pre-accession period. Key politicians continued to use
the EU for legitimating domestic reforms. Thus, Boyko Borisov, the leader of the GERB2
party that won the 2009 elections in Bulgaria, and Romanian President Traian Ba˘sescu
from the Romanian Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), derived their electoral support from
pro-European platforms. Such strategic legitimizing actions have been labelled by Woll
and Jacquot (2010) ‘usage of Europe’ (see also Haughton, 2014). But using the EU for
legitimation purposes is a two-way process which increases the EU’s leverage and makes
governments vulnerable to ‘naming and shaming’ strategies.
The findings of CVM reports and EU criticism in general matter to the extent to which
politicians rely on pro-European political legitimation discourses to attract voters. Stra-
tegic use of norms by the EU relies on their resonance in the domestic arena and the
1
‘The purpose of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism [. . .] is to ensure that administrative and judicial decisions
and practices in these areas [. . .] are in line with the rest of the EU.’ The Commission clarifies that judicial reform, fights
against organized crime and corruption are crucial for the target states to apply EU law correctly (Commission, 2007).
2 The Bulgarian abbreviation stands for Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria.
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presence of non-state actors interested in using the EU as a political resource (Woll and
Jacquot, 2010). Non-state actors have ensured the spread of EU norms and their societal
resonance. In 2013, a Bulgarian NGO produced an alternative ‘CVM report’ to highlight
the state of reform in particular areas (Bulgarian Association of Judges, 2013). The
Initiative for Clean Justice in Romania has regularly monitored government responses to
CVM reports (ICJ, 2008). Thus, both in terms of the CVM and the acquis, the success of
EU efforts to promote better governance after accession relies crucially on the preferences
and capacities of domestic actors interested in using the formal EU rules (Dimitrova,
2010) and the domestic resonance of EU norms. Building further on the conclusions of the
study by Sissenich (2010) that there is a positive correlation between state capacity and
civil participation, we believe that a coalition of domestic non-state actors and the EU
could compensate for some aspects of state weakness.
A range of studies from the Europeanization literature identifies non-state actors as
partners of the EU: NGOs and interest groups. Most civil society organizations in CEE,
however, have not yet acquired the organizational capacity and embededness to act as
partners of the state in policy-making. Nor have state administrations systematically
sought to involve them. This lack of co-operative relationship in policy-making has been
identified as problematic by some studies (for example, Börzel and Buzogány, 2010b).
Other analyses are more optimistic and suggest that contacts with the EU and the
EU’s requirements for consultation as part of implementation have strengthened and
professionalized certain kinds of NGOs (Andonova, 2005; Börzel and Buzogány, 2010a;
Carmin and Fagan, 2010).
A problem somewhat overlooked by the Europeanization literature is that, in a captured
state, domestic actors that co-operate with the EU are not the only ones influencing
policy-making. As discussed above, business entrepreneurs, sometimes organized as
NGOs, but mostly operating informally, are linked closely to state institutions and exert as
much, or possibly more, influence on policy-making procedures and outcomes than the
NGOs.3 The situation of these two sets of actors, however, is often asymmetric in terms of
their power and opportunities. Business actors are part of networks penetrating state
structures, but they are less likely to be aligned with the EU institutions due to their
informal manner of operating and lack of shared norms. Their interests are affected by EU
rules, which, if implemented properly, limit their ability to use the structures of the state
for personal gain. We assume therefore that NGOs connected to the EU would have an
advantage in pursuing their goals when EU-related measures are passed.4 Informal
veto players, on the other hand, have an advantage in closed policy processes with
limited transparency and only symbolic consultation. For the EU to make a difference to
democracy at the policy level, it would need to work with local actors promoting
meaningful consultation procedures and constrain other actors aiming to capture the
policy-making process. This is in line with Jacoby’s argument that the EU has an impact
through forming coalitions with certain domestic actors while constraining others (Jacoby,
2006, p. 625).
3 To differentiate state captors and NGOs, which are both non-state actors, we define the latter as sector-specific and
formally registered, with specific objectives linked to the policy field.
4 In this article, we do not differentiate between indigenous, grass-roots environmental NGOs and affiliates of large
international NGO networks, such as WWF or Greenpeace.
Post-accession policy-making in Bulgaria and Romania 143
© 2013 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Identifying the Conditions for Using the EU to Improve Governance
As Radaelli (2012, p. 5) has warned, we should be wary of identifying the EU as the only
possible cause of change and reform by focusing our analyses on a narrow, ‘Brussels to
Bucharest’ (or Sofia) pathway. A different perspective is presented by Woll and Jacquot
(2010) showing that domestic actors use the EU as a set of opportunities and constraints
and transform these in political practices to reach their own goals. When procedural rules
specifying the need for consultation and participation are part of the EU’s acquis, this still
does not ensure improvement in policy processes, as these rules need to be used by
domestic actors to become ‘rules-in-use’ in Ostrom’s term (Ostrom, 1999, p. 38). Bearing
this in mind, we analyze the configuration and preferences of domestic actors that may
invoke and use EU procedural rules.
We build on Woll and Jacquot’s (2010) argument that ‘usage of EU’ should be
analyzed as a domestic actor-driven process independent of existing formal institutional
arrangements. Their analysis highlights the strategic use of informal EU procedures by
domestic actors as a way to trigger domestic reform. We expect that formal rules pertain-
ing to different policy measures can be used by domestic actors in a similar way. The
evidence they present that actors move between different sectors or policy levels when
using the EU also shapes our expectations about the strategy of environmental NGOs
(Woll and Jacquot, 2010, pp. 118–19). We expect that some non-state actors will use the
EU to promote better policy-making not only in implementation of the acquis, but also in
other policies in the same sector.
Bringing these different insights together, we argue that the improvement of policy-
making processes in a specific sector would depend on the strategic interaction between
four sets of actors: (1) the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament;
(2) the state (central government and ministries); (3) the sector-specific, transnational or
national NGOs; and (4) the non-state business actors – state ‘captors’ that aim to influence
the policy process.
For our case study we select the strongly Europeanized environmental policy sector as
a good case for observing these effects of EU membership. Most national policy measures
in this field go back to some kind of EU impetus, and there are local non-state actors that
can invoke EU rules. EU policy templates strongly emphasize participatory measures
(Börzel, 2009). The requirements of EU biodiversity policy, culminating in the establish-
ment of the Natura 2000 Network as envisioned by the Flora-Fauna-Habitats Directive
92/43/EEC imply a considerable opening of biodiversity governance towards more inclu-
sive policy-making (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001). In contrast to biodiversity policy and in
keeping with our least likely case design, forestry policy, which we analyze here, has
largely remained a national domain, and thus the EU’s direct legal leverage is limited. If
we observe EU influence in such non-acquis policy area, either through direct interac-
tions, strategic use of norms or usage of the EU by domestic actors, we can claim that
accession has improved the policy process as a whole and thus the quality of democracy.
The forestry law amendments in Bulgaria and Romania are therefore a suitable sub-
case to explore whether links between the EU and domestic actors have led to changes
in the policy process. We look specifically for proper procedure, application of exist-
ing formal rules and public consultation as indicators for the improved quality of
policy-making defined in the introduction. We start our analysis by establishing the
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sector-specific state–society relations and the differences and similarities between Bul-
garia and Romania in environmental policy-making after accession.
II. Forestry Policy in Bulgaria and Romania
Our selection of Bulgaria and Romania identifies them as captured states with weak
regulating capacity, similar levels of EU influence through the CVM, but differentiated
NGO strength. World Bank indicators of state capacity place both countries at the bottom
of the EU Member States. Indicators of civil society activism (the European Values
Survey) and the environment in which NGOs operate (captured by USAID’s NGO
Sustainability Index),5 show that Bulgaria and Romania have rather weak societies.
Focusing on the environmental sector, however, a more nuanced picture emerges. While
the regulatory framework of environmental policy and the organizational resources of the
state seem to be more or less of similar strength – or, more accurately, weakness – in both
countries, we find variation in terms of the presence and strength of green civil society.
The number of active environmental NGOs registered in the Regional Environmental
Center’s directory of NGOs (as of 2004), is somewhat higher in Bulgaria than in Romania,
but more importantly, the role of Bulgaria’s environmental movement in the country’s
democratization has been much more prominent. Bulgarian environmental groups, such as
Ekoglasnost were among the main drivers of political change before the collapse of
communism in 1989–90, whereas in Romania this tradition was largely absent (Botcheva,
1996). Recent surveys suggest that environmental NGOs in Bulgaria have grown in terms
of organizational capacity and advocacy (Hristova, 2012, p. 38). Keeping these differ-
ences in mind, in the next part of the article, we will trace the two policy processes with
a view to evaluating the EU’s impact in interaction with domestic actors.
III. Bulgaria
The Policy Process
We begin with an important recent flashpoint, which serves as efficient entry point to a
complex set of relationships. In December 2011, an amendment to the existing Law on
Forestry in Bulgaria was proposed by the Bulgarian government.6 Changes introduced by
the draft would increase the exploitation of timber from Bulgarian forests above renewal
rates, thereby potentially weakening sustainable forest management and would make
certain kinds of construction possible in forest areas, limiting public control over forest
territories held by businesses under concession contracts. The attempt to adopt the amend-
ment led to the most significant social mobilization and protests in Bulgaria since the
winter of 1997–98. Procedural violations in the adoption of the draft, especially the lack
of proper consultation, as well as the content of the proposed amendments were the key
issues for protesters.
Forestry legislation in Bulgaria had been introduced in 1997 and amended numerous
times since then, almost twice yearly. By 2011, only 10 per cent of forests were in private
5 «http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/».
6 In Bulgarian: ‘Zakonoprockt za izmcncnic i dop4lncnic na Zakona za goritc N 102-01-91 s vnositcl Ministcrski
s4vct’.
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hands, but they supplied 20–25 per cent of timber. In 2000–09 there were multiple
allegations of swaps of seemingly cheap forest areas belonging to entrepreneurs linked to
the government for seaside properties and other areas attractive for development. Corrup-
tion allegations against government officials and ministers, who had authorized the swaps,
became one of the key issues in the electoral campaign of the GERB movement that won
the elections in 2009.
Aiming to avoid over-exploitation and limit informal use of forest areas for swaps, a
new law governing forestry areas was passed in February 2011. Yet in December 2011
another draft amendment containing far-reaching changes favourable to timber industry
players was proposed. It is this amendment that became the focus of protests and demands
for better consultation by domestic NGOs. Passing the law exhibited the typical charac-
teristics of a captured policy process: lack of transparency, fast adoption at first reading,
very limited consultation. The mandated period for public consultation during which the
parliament and the leading standing committee receive and incorporate submissions from
various societal interests fell between Christmas and New Year 2011.
A pre-existing informal coalition of environmental NGOs, called ‘For the Nature’,
intervened at this point and became an increasingly active participant in the debate around
the law.7 The coalition’s representatives explicitly identified citizens’ participation and
proper consultation as their key objectives (Krustanova, 2012, p. 3) next to substantive
changes in the draft limiting the possibilities for illegal exploitation of forest designated
areas. The coalition protested against the scheduling of the consultation period and its
symbolic character, appearing to aim to avoid proper consultation and citizen involve-
ment.8 This did not prevent initial discussions of the draft in the Standing Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry of the Bulgarian parliament from taking place in a similarly
cursory fashion. The law proceeded to second reading and adoption on 13 June 2012. In
this period environmental NGOs and other civil groups mobilized against the amendments
and organized an unprecedented protest campaign that combined official actions with
peaceful sit-ins and blockages of a major traffic intersection. The conflict around the
amendment became a highly politicized issue that remained at the centre of public
attention for months (Capital, 2013).9
As protests grew, the prime minister met with protesters and representatives of the
NGO coalition and promised an open debate of the amendments. Since the amendment
had already been adopted, NGOs used the only remaining legal possibility by appealing
to the president to use his constitutional right of veto and return the law for further
deliberation to parliament. The NGO coalition organized an online petition calling on the
president to use his right of veto, which he did, returning the law to parliament10 on 15
June 2012. On 27 June 2012, MPs voted to accept the presidential veto,11 – at this point
supported also by the prime minister. The presidential veto proved to be the turning point,
after which consultations were held with a broader group of stakeholders including ‘For
the Nature’ coalition. The final version of the law was adopted on 25 July 2012,12 without
7 See their website at: «http://www.forthenature.org».
8 Author interview with an NGO representative, 8 May 2012.
9 Based on Google trends data.
10 Presidential powers are limited in the constitution and the veto is conditional and can be rejected by parliament.
11 The vote record showed five votes in favour, 84 abstentions and 38 against.
12 State Gazette, No. 60, July 2012.
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most of the controversial amendments challenged by the ‘For the Nature’ coalition. As a
whole, the outcome was considered a success by the environmental coalition. Their
opponents appeared to see the amendments as unfavourable, as they declared in a press
conference in August 2012 that the law was unworkable and that they would appeal to the
European Commission.
Strategic Use of EU Rules by Civil Society
The EU played an important role in increasing the organizational capacity and
professionalization of environmental NGOs which continued after accession (Andonova
and Tuta, 2011; Krustanova, 2012). Even though the impulse for protests around the
forestry law amendment clearly came from the environmental NGOs themselves, they
were strengthened by their interactions with the EU in terms of capacity-building and by
using formal EU procedures and sanctions (where possible) or invoking ‘Europe’ as
suggested by Woll and Jacquot (2010). The following paragraphs briefly illustrate these
different mechanisms.
In terms of capacity-building, the coalition ‘For the Nature’ came together as a result
of the involvement of the NGOs in the establishment of the EU’s Natura 2000 network and
subsequent actions to protect designated nature preservation areas. Pre-accession,
members of some of the NGOs13 had carried out a substantial part of the expert work
involved in the definition, specification and mapping of areas for nature preservation for
the Natura 2000 network. Both interview data and other analyses (Krustanova, 2012) find
that the NGOs used the lessons learned from previous campaigns in the forestry cam-
paign. NGOs had also learned from their collaboration with the EU: in a survey, they listed
‘referring to EU institutions as an opportunity to influence national ones’ among key
advocacy techniques (Hristova, 2012, p. 65).
NGOs used the EU by providing input for CVM reports or signalling possible infringe-
ment cases related to EU environment acquis, but also rules on state aid. Evidence of these
interactions can be found in the Commission’s CVM reports, one of which directly
addressed forest land swaps (but not the amendment analyzed here). The 2009 report stated:
The Commission notes that laws which should prohibit abuse of land and forest swaps enter
into force as of 1 February (forests) and 1 March (land). The Commission will continue to
closely monitor the effective implementation of these laws. (Commission, 2009)
In an interview, NGO representatives listed contacts with the European Commission and,
post-2007, with Green MEPs as ways to mobilize political pressure and force government
to stop illegal practices. According to the same expert, Bulgarian institutions (the gov-
ernment and parliament) have been sensitive to reputational losses incurred by infringe-
ment procedures covered by Bulgarian media.14 The GERB government, which resigned
in February 2013 in reaction to continuing protests, was also sensitive to sanctions such
as the suspension of EU funding programmes. In short, in the words of the same expert,
the strategy of NGOs can be subsumed as ‘we resolve Bulgarian problems by presenting
them as European ones’.
13 Members of the NGOs Bulgarian Society for the Protection of Birds, Balkani and the Biodiversity Foundation.
14 Author interview with an NGO expert, 26 July 2012.
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Other Players: Entangled with the State
As discussed above, other non-state actors involved in business and connected to state
structures, difficult to capture as they are, have an important influence on policy-making
in the post-communist context (Dimitrova, 2010). In the case of Bulgaria, indirect evi-
dence of non-state actors laundering money through tourism development projects has
been mentioned in the European Commission’s CVM monitoring report of July 2012.
Specific cases of business entrepreneurs working in parliament and pushing specific
amendments were exposed by investigations of the Parliamentary Commission for Pre-
vention and Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest. Specifically, the deputy chairman of the
Agriculture and Forests Committee (dealing with the law), was investigated and found
guilty of conflict of interest on two separate counts.15
The involvement of entrepreneurs closely linked to state structures became increas-
ingly visible during the forestry amendment policy process. Three different groups of
actors emerged to defend the controversial forestry amendments during the additional
consultations. The first – the private forest owners – argued in a submission to parliament
during the post-presidential-veto consultations that provisions allowing wood cutting to
up to 80 per cent above replacement levels were necessary to guarantee their rights to
dispose of their property. The second group defending the amendments of the forestry law,
led apparently by the impression that they would promote tourism, were local government
representatives from mountain areas. They participated in a so-called ‘counter-protest’,
although, according to interviews, some mayors had ordered local civil servants to protest
and bussed them to the capital. The third actor was an offshore registered company with
murky ownership, ‘Vitosha ski’, holding a concession for operating the ski lifts at the
Vitosha Mountain near the capital. They argued for amendments facilitating the develop-
ments of new lifts and using forest territories as ski resorts. Known for their personal links
to the prime minister, they were the most active advocates of the amendments, as shown
by the publicly available minutes of the additional consultations.
Changes in the Policy Process: Limiting State Capture through Wider Consultations
The NGO’s mobilization of a broad group of young and educated protesters able to
propose alternative policy solutions stopped the forestry amendment, but also constrained
state capture by advocating and getting more transparent policy procedures. Evidence of
the environmental actors’ process-related preferences (in terms of formal procedures, rule
of law and transparency) can be found in the minutes of the additional consultations
published online in their entirety. Such a record of participants and their positions is in
stark contrast to the anonymity of ‘state captors’, participants influencing the earlier
drafting of the law and is nearly unprecedented for Bulgarian state institutions. The first
request of the representatives of the environmental coalition in the consultations was
observance of legal procedures instead of ‘secret informal deals’. The last of the consul-
tation meetings exhibited the features of a real – and not just symbolic – consultation, with
all interested stakeholders explicitly identified and presenting their positions.
The government’s openness to these meetings and to extending the consultation period
and the drafting procedure was clearly linked to the ruling party’s pro-EU political
15 According to an investigation in Capital weekly (Gospodinova, 2012).
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platform and legitimation. Furthermore, environmental issues clearly had broad societal
resonance. In January 2013, the regular sociological survey tracking electoral attitudes
identified the unauthorized development permitted by local and national authorities in
Natura 2000 areas at the Bulgarian seaside as one of the top three most negatively
perceived actions of the government.
What effect did all this activity have on the quality of the policy-making process? Our
initial expectation that the EU would be directly involved and invoke the CVM was not
confirmed. The controversial policy measure was simply not part of the EU’s acquis. By
contrast, the second mechanism of EU influence we outlined – concerned actors using the
EU as a strategic resource – was observed. Ultimately, the policy process around the




Paralleling in many ways developments around the same time in neighbouring Bulgaria,
in 2011 a cross-party coalition of Romanian MPs with intimate ties to the timber industry
introduced a legislative initiative aiming to replace existing forest legislation with a
so-called ‘New Forest Code’.16 The changes proposed by this all-party coalition were
highly controversial and included the possibility of increasing the volume of timber
exploitation, weakening principles of sustainable forest management and easing re-zoning
of forested areas so that they could be used commercially. After the initiative had passed
through the Senate without being discussed in depth, the Agriculture and Forests Com-
mittee of the House of the Representatives approved the proposal after a public hearing
that excluded organizations critical of the initiative (WWF Romania, 2012).
The passing of the New Forest Code was the latest stage in almost two decades of
perpetual redrafting of Romania’s forestry legislation. Several waves of land property
restitutions resulted in transferring two-thirds of the overall forested territory in Romania
from state to private or local public ownership. This massive change in the ownership
structures was followed by the emergence of new actors, such as private forest owners, but
also environmental NGOs in the forestry sector, hitherto under strong state control (Novac
and Auer, 2004).
While the New Forest Code was met with criticism in parts of academia and among
civil society organizations, no sweeping public protests that could be compared to those
in Bulgaria were witnessed. It was rather the change of the government in April 2012 and
the political crisis unfolding in the following months that postponed passing the amend-
ments. Parallel to this development, nature protection legislation adopted in the context of
Romania’s EU accession became increasingly relevant for forested territories as these
harbour species and habitats subject to the EU’s Natura 2000 directives. Following the
spillover logic outlined above, this allowed environmental organizations to get their foot
in the door of what had been a highly opaque forestry policy. In March 2013, responding
to criticism by civil society organizations, the new government unexpectedly withdrew the
draft from parliament and initiated a new, more open consultation process to be carried out
16 In Romanian: Proiectul de Lege pentru modificarea s¸i completarea Legii nr. 46/2008 – Codul silvic (PL.x 573/2011).
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in 2013. The new consultations included different groups of stakeholders, such as forest
owners, environmental organizations and trade unions active in the forestry field. Thus,
even if to a lesser extent than in the Bulgarian case, we find evidence of increased
consultation and more transparency in Romanian forestry policy.
Strategic Use of EU Rules by Civil Society
Civil society organizations have been the key players supporting the domestic implemen-
tation of EU nature protection directives in Romania. The Romanian offices of WWF and
Greenpeace became central actors co-ordinating the work of the ‘NGO Coalition Natura
2000’ (‘Coalit¸ia ONG Natura 2000 România’). Especially WWF Romania, led by the
former liberal MEP Magor Csibi, became involved in lobbying on nature conservation
matters both in Bucharest and Brussels.
Just as in Bulgaria, working with the European Commission has strengthened NGOs’
advocacy and networking capacity (Andonova and Tuta, 2011; Parau, 2009). Environ-
mental NGOs repeatedly put the government under pressure by providing the European
Commission with information on violations connected to the Natura 2000 sites. During
the designation process of protected sites, the European Commission has regularly fol-
lowed the view of NGOs against the government’s position and declared the list of
protected sites proposed by the Romanian government incomplete. The exclusion of sites
proposed by the NGOs from the official list of protected sites resulted in the EU launching
the first infringement procedure on environmental policy against Romania. The Commis-
sion remained active in monitoring the implementation process beyond the formal legal
procedure and carried out an unexpected field visit in 2012 to check details of the
designation process.17
Civil society mobilization against the New Forest Code could build on the networks
and expertise forged during the Natura 2000 campaigns. WWF, Greenpeace and more than
70 grass-roots environmental organizations brought media attention to the initially secre-
tive parliamentary debates on the forestry amendment by pointing to the vested interests
behind it. They exerted pressure on individual MPs by using media and direct mail
campaigns. In the context of the campaign, Greenpeace carried out a larger scientific study
highlighting the significant degradation of forested territory during the two decades since
regime change (Greenpeace Romania, 2012). WWF Romania presented a full-fledged
alternative draft of the legislation with detailed description of the potential problems and
alternatives.18
In contrast to the Bulgarian case, forestry policy was not mentioned in the CVM
reports. However, the NGO Coalition used the EU in the campaign by creatively linking
forestry issues to the question of ‘good governance’ – a recurring topic in Romania in the
context of the CVM. Their strategy was to connect the issue of forestry to the broad
discourse about the causes of corruption and refer to EU criticism. Referring to allegations
of corruption in the forestry sector secured a wider audience than could be achieved by
mobilizing citizens on environmental issues. Furthermore, forestry policy was targeted
not only by environmental NGOs, but also by some of Romania’s most important
17 Author interview with an environmental NGO, 21 February 2013.
18 The document can be found at: «http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/amendamente_cod_silvic_final_05_11_2012_1
.doc».
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anti-corruption NGOs and think tanks, such as the Romanian Academic Society, which
helped advance the ‘cognitive usage’ (Woll and Jacquot, 2010, p. 117) of references to EU
membership to secure public attention.
Other Players: A Fusion between Business and State Structures
The partial privatization of Romanian forested territory has resulted in blurred ownership
structures best described by Stark and Bruszt’s (1998) term ‘recombinant property’,
referring to situations where assets are transferred into private firms but liabilities remain
state property. The National Forest Administration Romsilva, which not only manages
state forests, but is also the regulator of the field, became a vehicle for extraction of rents
by its politically nominated leadership. Romsilva was regarded as the main culprit behind
the dramatic rise in illegal logging during the last decade, resulting in irreparable losses in
forested territories. Its leadership has been accused of illegally contributing to campaign
budgets of governing parties and of corrupt decisions in numerous local and national
public procurement cases. For example, in a much publicized case, the Supreme Court of
Justice acquitted the head of Romsilva of causing several millions worth of financial
damage by buying uniforms (including Versace tiepins) for all foresters in Romania at
highly inflated prices (Nutu et al., 2011). MPs with financial interests in the wood
processing sector, often described as ‘timber barons’, could trade their contacts to gov-
ernment, other state institutions and the judiciary for privileged access to information or
protection from prosecution. Among the MPs initiating the New Forest Code, cases of
conflict of interest were abundant: businessmen elected as politicians and acting as
regulators included the chair and the rapporteur in the Agriculture and Forest Standing
Committee. It is exactly this kind of political influence over state institutions that the EU
has tried to constrain through the CVM.
EU rules and their usage seem to have recently contributed to some loosening of the
‘unholy’ coalition between state institutions and private business interests. Increasingly,
environmental organizations are using litigation before Romanian domestic courts. Using
EU-inspired access to information legislation, Greenpeace Romania was successful in
gaining access to documents justifying the clearing of forested territories.19 Further
institutional changes within Romanian forestry were triggered by the country’s significant
problems in implementing the Natura 2000 Directive (Buzogány, 2009). These problems
prompted the European Commission to initiate a ‘functional review’ of Romania’s en-
vironmental management system, which revealed unclear division of competencies and
suggested the need for a thorough reform of Romsilva (World Bank, 2011). Therefore,
while the EU has had no direct leverage over forest policy, external influence on the sector
has been exerted as a spillover from other, more Europeanized policy fields.
Market opening and property restitution have also brought powerful new actors into the
forestry sector, leading to the acquisition of large portions of forested territory by foreign
investors. Proforest, the lobby group representing the largest foreign-owned timber com-
panies has established intimate ties with Romsilva and the Ministry of Environment and
Forests. However, their position and access to state structures are not uncontested as actors
19 Greenpeace: «http://www.greenpeace.org/romania/ro/campaigns/schimbari-climatice-energie/paduri/activitati/proces
-castigat-pentru-paduri/».
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in the field of forestry policy have multiplied as the forest restitution process created about
830,000 forest owners, represented by a large number of organizations, with diverse
members and interests.
Process Change: Usage of EU Links by All Actors
In contrast to the big players in forestry business, such as Romsilva and Proforest, the
access of small private forest owners to the policy-making process around the New Forest
Code was restricted. However, just like the environmental organizations connected to
EU-level networks, these organizations established and used contacts with sectoral
organizations of small forest owners at the EU level, such as Confederation of European
Forest Owners. In the New Forest Code debates, they referred to Romania’s need to cope
with EU forestry regulations (‘legitimizing usage’ in Woll and Jacquot’s [2010, p. 117]
terminology). The Association of Forest Owners in Romania (an umbrella organization
of local and county associations and Federation Nostra Silva) has argued that EU agri-
cultural aid schemes for protected territories under the Natura 2000 network or the
so-called ‘Illegal Timber Regulation(995/2010) have to be implemented to prevent
infringement proceedings (Ionescu, 2011). While deliberations on the new draft of the
forestry law, initiated in early 2013, have not been completed, some EU-related arguments
have clearly been taken up by government officials charged with reformulating the policy
(Capital, 2013).
Summarizing the Romanian case study, we find fewer clear signs of improved trans-
parency and increased consultation than in Bulgaria, but we could detect at least some
development towards adherence to formal rules. While the coalition between state actors
and business interests still seems to be controlling the policy process, there has been an
emergence of new actors – foreign investors, who, at least on the formal level, accept a
higher level of transparency and consultation. This gradual procedural change was also
driven by environmental organizations and owner associations, which strategically linked
their protest to the EU’s anti-corruption agenda and tried to capitalize on overlaps of
forestry policy with established EU policies in nature conservation.
Conclusions
The policy-making processes analyzed in the second part of this article provided abundant
evidence of interactions between the EU and non-state actors in both Bulgaria and
Romania. In both countries, the pro-environment coalitions not only engaged with the
implementation of environmental rules, but also carried over procedural requirements
potentially limiting state capture to other policy measures. With their transnational links
and increased expertise and capacity, environmental NGOs served as conduits for norm
diffusion and participated in two-level games in which they sought to use EU rules and
involve the EU or other international actors to change policy practices and prevent or limit
effective state capture, which was a constant threat in this policy domain.
We documented variation in the degree to which the interactions between the EU and
these actors have brought improvements in the procedural aspects of the policy processes
in our two cases. In Bulgaria, the environmental activists built on their long tradition of
political mobilization to successfully open up the policy process on the forestry law, while
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in Romania, large forestry business kept a stronger position at the national level. In
Bulgaria NGOs ultimately prevented the adoption of controversial aspects of the forestry
law promoting business interests, while in Romania the process of redrafting continues
and outcomes are uncertain. Nevertheless, even in Romania we have seen increasing
pluralism, where state captors are increasingly challenged by smaller forestry owner
associations and environmental organizations. This could not have happened in either
country if governments had not previously relied on pro-European legitimation mecha-
nisms and been sensitive to EU criticism in the CVM context. Thus, we find that a
multi-level, multi-actor framework that takes into account both government legitimation
strategies and civil society strength can help predict how effective the EU can be to
promote good governance post-accession.
The most important conclusion of our case studies is that even in least likely cases of
a non-acquis policy area in states with weak capacities, we can still find domestic actors
able to instrumentalize EU tools to improve the policy process. Thus, the impact of the EU
on democratic quality in terms of the policy process cannot be ignored. The possibility of
appealing to the EU when the formal rules of procedure and possibilities for consultation
are circumvented is an important aspect of the development of democratic governance in
these states. In this regard, and in contrast with Innes (2014) and Sedelmeier (2014), we
find that the EU has provided an opportunity to CEE actors to promote policy procedural
aspects of democratic governance. While we cannot generalize based on these two cases,
it is reasonable to expect that such processes of sectoral spillover of norms, initiated by
interested domestic actors, can help close the gap between eastern and western Member
States (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014). This possibility is conditional, however, on support for
the EU remaining strong among the broader public.
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